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Abstract 
Canada-Africa Relations in Changing 
Core-Periphery  Dynamics: A Chance to 
‘‘Come Back’’ Differently 
The Department of Foreign Affairs Canada sees the dynamism at play across 
the African continent as calling out for Canadian engagement. Africa in the 
twenty-first century is no longer the continent emerging from colonial rule;  
it seeks new forms of relationships with international partners. The African 
Development Bank, for instance, has identified five priorities for inclusive 
growth on the continent. The challenges are huge, as is the potential for 
transformative change. But the conditions for international collaboration in 
achieving these goals have changed; African leaders are seeking new forms 
of associations and teamwork. Canada has an opportunity to ‘‘come back’’ 
differently if it can look beyond  its  narrow  mining  interests  and become 
an active partner working with public authorities in need of new and bold 
international partnerships. Unfortunately, Trudeau’s ‘‘Canada is back’’ 
campaign does not look set to change the status quo. And, in a world where 
the political economic power is moving east, African countries do not have 
much reason to listen to Canada. 
Keywords: Africa, Canada, African Development Bank, development, China 
Re´sume´ 
Le ministe`re canadien des Affaires e´trange`res voit le dynamisme qui anime le 
continent africain comme un appel a` l’engagement du Canada. L’Afrique du 
XXIe sie`cle n’est plus le continent qui se libe`re du joug colonial ; elle cherche 
a` e´tablir de nouvelles relations avec des partenaires internationaux. Ainsi la 
Banque africaine de de´veloppement a-t-elle de´fini cinq priorite´s acce´le´ratrices 
de de´veloppement inte´gre´ du continent. Les de´fis sont comme le potentiel de 
profonds changements. Mais les conditions de la collaboration internationale 
a`  l’atteinte de ces objectifs ont change´  ; les leaders africains sont a`  la re- 
cherche de nouvelles formes d’association et de travail en e´quipe. L’occasion 
s’offre au Canada de faire les choses diffe´remment s’il s’efforce de porter le 
regard au-dela` de ses stricts inte´reˆts miniers et de devenir un partenaire actif 
travaillant de concert avec les pouvoirs publics a` la formation de partenariats 
internationaux nouveaux et solides. Malheureusement, l’affirmation de Justin 
Trudeau selon laquelle « le Canada est de retour » ne semble pas l’e´loigner 
du  statu  quo.  En  outre,  compte  tenu  du  de´placement  du  pouvoir  politico- 
e´conomique  vers  l’Est,  les  pays  africains  sont  peu  enclins  a`  e´couter  le 
Canada. 
 
  
  
 
Mots cle´s : Afrique, Banque africaine de de´veloppement, Canada, Chine, 
de´veloppement 
 
I hope Canada’s new government is looking for partners in the [African] 
continent and not a Santa Claus role in an ever-changing continent that is 
in need of new and bold leadership. 
—Getachew 2016 
 
Is Canada ready to forgo the Santa Claus role to build a different foreign 
policy with this quickly changing continent? This does not seem to be the 
case thus far. 
Bumping into Ste´phane Dion on a freezing Ottawa day in 2017, Canada’s 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me that ‘‘on est de retour en 
Afrique.’’ In 2016, Dion visited Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya as part of 
Trudeau’s ‘‘Canada is back’’ campaign. The goal of the trip was to broaden 
the Conservative’s former narrow African focus to countries beyond South 
Africa (Black and Hornsby 2016). Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
sees the dynamism at play across the African continent1 as calling out for 
Canadian engagement. But what does Canadian engagement and being ‘‘back’’ 
in Africa mean in the twenty-first century, for Africans and for Canadians? 
Does it mean being back after a notable decline in international solidarity efforts 
brought on by decades of neoliberal policy? Or does it mean slipping back 
into the idealized role of ‘‘Canada as a humane country deeply engaged with 
Africa’’ (Hornsby 2014, 334)? Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visited Mali  
in 2016 without making firm commitments to assist international security 
missions under way in West Africa. This disappointing outcome indicates 
that Trudeau’s policy of ‘‘being back’’  in Africa does not appear, so far,  
very different from Harper’s ‘‘economic diplomacy’’ (York 2013). 
Mining is the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment into Africa 
(McHenry, Doepel, and Urama 2017), and, as far as investment in the extrac- 
tive industry is concerned, Canada has never been more involved (Engler 
2015). Canada occupies a special mineral/financial niche where 70 percent  
of global mining equity capital is raised on the Toronto (TSX) and Venture 
(TSXV) exchanges (Minesonline 2013, 1). Canadian mining investment has 
increased more than 100-fold over the last two decades (Leon Moorsom 
2017), all the while advocating the retreat of African governments from this 
lucrative sector (Campbell 2011). Canada’s mining in Africa is buttressed   
by a national myth, endorsed by the government and the mining sector, of 
‘‘Canada as a humane, rights-respecting, globally responsible state’’ (Butler 
2015, 18–19). But Canada’s history in Africa is more one of consistent incon- 
sistency (Black 2015), as mining activities are associated with human rights 
violations, unethical behaviour, deforestation, and land degradation. 
  
 
In this short article, I argue that Canada has an opportunity to ‘‘be back’’ 
differently if it can look beyond its mining profits and become, as Getachew 
highlights in the above quote, a partner in this rapidly changing continent in 
need of new and bold international partnerships. If it can do this, then maybe 
African countries will be listening to Canada in 25 years. If it continues along 
the path of ‘‘consistent inconsistency,’’ as Black (2015) puts it, then African 
leaders will be listening to other countries, most likely from the Global South. 
I briefly review, in the first section of this article, whether Africa is set to 
effectively take on increased importance in Trudeau’s ‘‘Canada is back’’ 
strategy. The rest of the article then proceeds along the lines of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland’s (2017) observation that there are two 
global forces to which we need to pay attention: the rapid emergence of the 
Global South, and ‘‘the woes of our middle class.’’ As I point out in the next 
section, these two global forces point precisely to global structural changes 
impacting on Canadian-African relations. In this context, as I highlight under 
the heading ‘‘First Point: Africa Is in a Global Political Economy Moving 
East,’’ the most significant structural change is the shift of the global economy 
toward Asia (Arrighi 2007; Quah 2011). African countries are increasingly 
listening and looking eastwards as leaders look for new partners to assist in 
meeting the multiple development challenges it faces. African actors and 
leaders are no longer in the undesirable position of depending predominantly 
on North Atlantic countries for aid, trade, and political alliances. This is 
followed by my second point, ‘‘Africa Wants to Be Middle Class, Too,’’ 
where I critically assess Freeland’s claim that Canada  can help  the people  
of the world’s fastest-growing countries join the global middle class. There 
appears to be a lack of analysis that capitalism’s progress is usually globally 
uneven and that maybe the rise of the global rest will mean less middle- 
classness in Canada. After all, the next significant growth of middle-class 
populations is predicted to take place in Africa. The other side to this coin, 
however, is to note that most of the world’s population growth will happen  
in Africa, posing a momentous challenge for inclusive development across the 
continent. The last section therefore draws attention to the African Develop- 
ment Bank’s (AfDB) collaborative ‘‘High 5’’ priorities; I argue that this 
strategy offers an opportunity for Canada to come back to Africa differently 
as a bold partner in meeting these goals. 
 
So, It Is Not Usual Business as Usual 
Canada, like countries worldwide, recognizes that Africa’s narrative is chang- 
ing because of the region’s economic potential (Global Affairs Canada 2014). 
Canada’s new foreign affairs minister, Chrystia Freeland (2012), made the 
case that Africa was effectively the world’s new economic tiger. This ‘‘African 
tiger,’’ however, no longer wishes to feed global corporate profits through 
unfettered laissez-faire capitalism (Dawson 2013). The AfDB (2013) targets 
inclusive growth that will build human capital and transform African societies. 
  
 
This is a deliberate move away from a model of unrestrained growth privileg- 
ing global corporations and the elite (Berman 2015), which speaks directly to 
Canada’s less than stellar historic role in Africa’s extractive industry. 
Along these lines, let us turn to Freeland’s speech on Canada’s foreign 
policy priorities given on 6 June 2017. Freeland asked an important question, 
relevant to the country and of interest to this special issue: ‘‘Is Canada an 
essential country, at this time in the life of our planet?’’ The minister high- 
lighted the roles Canada has played in establishing the current liberal world 
order: being involved in the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, establishing the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, partaking in the Universal Declara- 
tion on Human Rights, and Lester B. Pearson’s receiving the Nobel Peace 
Prize for the creation of modern peacekeeping. According to Freeland, this 
world order is now being challenged by two global forces: 
1. the rapid emergence of the Global South—Asia in general and China 
in particular—and the need to integrate these emerging powers into 
the international multilateral system built by the Atlantic powers of 
North America and Western Europe; and 
2. what Freeland calls ‘‘the woes of our middle class’’—the growing 
doubt that a globalizing political economy will continue to deliver 
benefits to those used to receiving them. 
Now these two global forces—the rise of Asia and what we can refer    
to as the ‘‘uneven development’’ of capitalism (Harvey 2006), where benefits 
are not experienced equally around the world—point precisely to global 
structural changes under way. The traditional three worlds of the twentieth 
century are giving way to new geopolitical imaginings, where third-world/ 
underdeveloped/backward/developing countries are now emerging markets 
(Sidaway and Pryke 2000). It is about the geography of politics and the 
politics of geography (Smith 2008). Canada’s relations with African countries 
will be shaped by these geopolitical reconfigurations as we wait to see where 
the new core and peripheries emerge. As the next section argues, for African 
countries, the new core is Asia. 
 
First Point: Africa Is in a Global Political Economy Moving East 
The world is undergoing important shifts, and Africa’s place is changing as 
we move away from the Western-centred neoliberal world order (Gray and 
Murphy 2013). Importantly, African countries are integrating a global economy 
driven by the growth and rising prosperity in (mainly Asian) emerging markets, 
which account for 38 percent of all global flows (Manyika et al. 2014, 3). Africa 
is the second-fastest-growing economic region after East Asia. Exceptional 
conditions of the last decade have spurred this growth: the financial crisis of 
2008 pumped liquidity into the global system as the US Federal Reserve put 
in place its quantitative easing policy (Fiano 2015; Tan 2015); Africa is seen 
as a new frontier market (Moghalu 2010; Napier 2010) and was recipient of 
  
 
global flows searching higher returns on investment; and emerging economies, 
particularly Asian countries, are trading and investing more heavily in Africa 
(Nowak 2016; Taylor 2012). All of these factors, along with the continent’s 
average growth of 4.5 percent over the past two decades (World Bank 2015), 
supports the observation that African economies are in fact (still) rising. 
In Adam Smith in Beijing, Arrighi (2007) revisits the rise of the West,  
its eclipse of China in the nineteenth century, the rise of US hegemony, and 
China’s recent rise to greater centrality in the world economy. Working with 
data from 700 locations around the world, Quah (2011) projects that the 
economic centre of gravity, the global ‘‘core,’’ will be located between India 
and China by 2050. In 1980, the centre of gravity was the mid-Atlantic. This 
position shored up what was to be an ‘‘end of history’’ moment of triumphant 
liberalism; however, the global economic passed over the West, reaching 
Bucharest by 2008. China, as the Financial Times’s chief foreign affairs 
commentator Gideon Rachman (2017) wrote in the wake of the nineteenth 
Communist Party Congress in Beijing, is challenging the West on three fronts: 
ideological, economic, and geopolitical. 
These three fronts are clear in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
The BRI is a geopolitical plan, as well as an economic one, and it is, I argue, 
a large technical system (LTS). The importance of LTSs within global politics 
is apparent through intersectionality with political authority, power, geo- 
politics, infrastructure, trade routes, military power, and territory. The BRI 
will incorporate a variety of subsystems along its routes as it links Asia, 
Europe, Africa, and Oceania. Notable is the inclusion of East Africa as a 
strategic region for China’s new global trade and investment network. East 
African countries will act as gateways feeding into this LTS. What is the 
extent of competition, divergence, or convergence being generated through 
China’s initiative? In other words, countries deepening their integration into 
the global economy, as is the case of African states, need to manage com- 
petition in the broader global context of geopolitical fragmentation brought 
on by new global powers. 
The twentieth century was marked, as noted by Freeland (2017) in her 
speech, by the growth of liberal institutionalism. This places emphasis on  
the role of common goals in governance and the ability of international 
organizations to foster co-operation between states. If we turn to consider 
materialism in global governance, as Mayer and Acuto (2015) suggest we 
need to do, by moving LTSs to the centre stage of analysis, I contend that   
we need to consider China’s BRI as an emerging global system of political 
economic power that will operate alongside Western-led liberal regimes. 
African countries are therefore concerned with remaining part of the liberal 
world order and its key institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, 
but recognize that development, growth, and wealth will increasingly come 
through Asian-led mega projects like the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initia- 
tive. While this project is portrayed as an opportunity to strengthen Sino- 
  
 
African relations and provide economic development opportunities, only 
African countries of strategic value will be directly prioritized and benefit 
most from the initiative (Bagwandeen 2017). This means that there will be 
heightened geopolitical competition, as African states attempt to control sites 
of privileged access—gateways through ports, logistics parks, and trans- 
portation corridors—to China’s global networks. As Adam Ward (2017) of 
Chatham House puts it, ‘‘in the cracks which geopolitical fragmentation is 
opening up, there is more space, opportunity and compulsion for antagonists 
to compete.’’ This can be observed as Kenya and Tanzania each endeavour to 
direct flows moving inland—to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and parts of Zambia— 
doing so through their respective national infrastructure systems. 
Additionally, the global economic core will continue to move eastward 
over the Eurasia land mass, along the Indian Ocean Rim, and into the Asia- 
Pacific. What emerges is a changed landscape for African countries as they 
navigate overlapping world orders. This different  global context describes    
a radically different picture compared to that of Freeland’s declaration that 
the North Atlantic axis of political economic power must incorporate Asia 
into its world order. Noticeably, Canada appears to be falling behind in the 
reshuffling global order (Macdonald and Paltiel 2016). It is rather more the 
case that Canada too will be looking beyond the North Atlantic axis of power 
as the Indian Ocean Rim and the Asia-Pacific region become loci of global 
political economic power. 
 
Second Point: Africa Wants to Be Middle Class, Too 
The second point made by Freeland was what she called the woes of Canada’s 
middle classes. While there is some debate as to whether middle-class families 
in Canada have stagnated economically over the last decades (Boudreaux and 
Lammam 2016), it is very clear that too many Africans continue to live in 
poverty. After two decades of unprecedented economic growth, the number of 
Africans living in extreme poverty still increased by more than 100 million 
people (Beegle et al. 2016, v). On the other hand, however, developing and 
emerging economies lost US$7.8 trillion in illicit financial flows from 2004 
to 2013 (Kar and Spanjers 2015). Yet, Freeland suggests that Canada’s model 
of globalization, which ‘‘embraces multiculturalism and diversity,’’ can keep 
the rise of extremist politics and ultra-nationalists at bay as it ‘‘better supports 
the middle class, and those working hard to join it’’: 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia 
are on the ascendant, delivering ever-increasing living standards to 
fast-growing populations bursting with innovation, creativity and 
enterprise. . . . Let us seize the great opportunity we now have to help 
the people of the world’s fastest-growing countries join the global 
middle class and the multilateral system that supports it. (Freeland 2017) 
  
 
Uneven development has been the bread and butter of the Global South 
for centuries (Oyelaren-Oyeyinka and Rasiah 2009). Accordingly, the concept 
of class has been widely discussed in Africanist scholarship (Resnick 2015), 
with any definition minimally needing to include security from economic 
vulnerability and prospects for social mobility (Thurlow, Resnick, and Ubogu 
2015). So yes, Freeland is correct. Africans have been struggling to join the 
middle classes as they work to overcome colonial legacies and structural 
political economic global power favouring Western industrialized economies. 
Freeland is also right to point out that we live in a more unequal world: 
as 233 new billionaires are added to Forbes’ 2017 list (Forbes Staff 2017), 
income inequality is rising (OECD 2015); those with wealth of more than 
$30 million reached 226,450 in 2017, an increase of 3.5 percent (Greenhalgh 
2017). Eight men now own the same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who 
make up the poorest half of humanity (Oxfam 2017). This is taking place in  
a world where global unemployment is set to rise to 200 million (Interna- 
tional Labour Organization  2016). This is compounded by ongoing effects  
of the global financial crisis as the world lives through times of great political 
uncertainty, the rise of populism, and renewed economic nationalism and 
turbulence. Africa’s experience, in particular (Bond and Ruiters 2017), chal- 
lenges the (liberal) idea that globalization is a tide that lifts all boats (Warwick 
Research Collective 2015). 
It may just be that in a world where economic production and wealth 
moves east, Western countries will begin to experience more uneven develop- 
ment within their own borders, and African countries will be lifted by a 
different tide, increasing continental growth and wealth. Will Canada remain 
part of the privileged group of the twentieth century, or will it find itself more 
at the margins and peripheries of global political economic power? 
 
Conclusion: Canada, Listen to African Countries 
To prosper, Africa needs a massive, concerted, ambitious effort to transform 
our economies. . . . The High 5 priorities will get us there more quickly. 
—Adesina 2016 
 
In answer to the question of whether African countries will be listening to 
Canada in 25 years, I suggest, rather, that Canada listen to African countries. 
It is in Africa, I argue, that we get a glimpse of global transformations under 
way as the continent sits at the heart of overlapping worlds, between the West 
and rising Asia, between Global North and Global South, with the fastest 
rising youth population. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) point out in 
Theory from the South, the Global South is at the epicenter of contemporary 
global transformations. It is here that we see that unfolding developments are 
contradictory, uneven, contested, and, for the most part, undocumented. 
  
 
In the same year as Dion’s sub-Saharan African tour, the African Develop- 
ment Bank launched its High 5 strategy: light up and power Africa, feed 
Africa, industrialize Africa, integrate Africa, and  improve  the  quality  of 
life for the people of Africa. This five-pronged policy is crucial for Africa’s 
economic transformation and inclusive growth. The AfDB’s request for con- 
certed and collaborative effort around these strategies suggests that Canada 
has an opportunity to come back and act differently in Africa. This does not 
mean closing down Canada’s investments in Africa but doing things differ- 
ently. In particular, the AfDB’s (2017) Light Up and Power Africa—The 
New Deal on Energy for Africa policy could be of interest to Canadian busi- 
nesses as it aims to mobilize international capital for innovative financing in 
Africa’s energy sector. This would mean for Canada to develop an African 
foreign policy beyond its narrow extractive interests and to understand that 
the structural game is changing—for African countries as well as for Canada. 
The degree to which African countries will therefore be listening to Canada is 
in direct relation to the extent that Canada is listening in return and coming 
back to Africa differently. 
 
Note 
1. Africa is 55 countries—a continent, not a single country. To cite Pius Adesanmi 
(2011), ‘‘You are not a country Africa, you are a concept, fashioned in our 
minds, each to each.’’ It is in this spirit that I refer to ‘‘Africa’’ in this article; 
I will not be referring to some/all countries. 
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